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Abstract 
This paper presents a review of the different models developed for the taxicab problem. The presented models are grouped in 
two categories, aggregated and equilibrium models. Each model is analyzed from different points of view, such as market 
organization, operational organization and regulation issues. Conclusions extracted by authors are presented, listed and 
compared, analyzing each affirmation in terms of market regulation and organization. Finally, a state of the practice is presented, 
analyzing the configuration of the taxi market regulations along the world, linking the conclusions obtained by the authors with 
the real market situations. 
Keywords:The taxicab problem; Modeling taxi services; Taxi regulation; Transportation; Taxi 
1. Introduction 
Actual cities are oversaturated, on one hand most of the population is concentrated in large cities (in 2030 more 
than 80% (UNFPA 2007) of the population will live in urban areas), on the other hand mobility needs of the modern 
population are growing continuously. While urban demand for trips is growing constantly, supply (capacity of city 
streets) is limited, and must be optimized, not increased (most of the times not possible inside the city). Well-
planned, efficiently operated, and cost-effective transportation system management (TSM) strategies can improve 
mobility of existing systems for transportation users, especially in urban environments, where a good optimization 
of the infrastructure is needed (considering the high cost of building new facilities and the continuously increasing 
demand resulting from economical and population growth). Last years tendencies are shifting person trips from 
private vehicles to public vehicles, increasing the Public Transport share importantly. The most used Public 
Transports are the “Mass Transports” such as metro, tram or bus. This kind of transport usually has a centralized 
management which uses ITS technologies developed in the last decade for an optimal operation of the service. 
Unfortunately, inflexibility, long total travel time and insufficient service coverage of Mass Transport systems cause 
a lower usage of them in most metropolitan areas. Oppositely, the taxi-cab sector is a more convenient mode due to 
its speediness, door-to-door attribute, privacy, comfort, long-time operation and lack of parking fees. The great 
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inconvenience is the lack of central management; each taxi is operated by an independent driver, taking his own 
decisions continuously, with a weak intent of control by the policy issues of each city such as license control or 
distributing the working days of the taxi vehicles (normally the control is imposed on vehicles, not on drivers, 
generating double shift and increasing the use of taxis). An important percentage of the cars (e. g. 60% in Hong 
Kong (Yang et al. 2000)) in the daily flow are taxis, most of them empty taxies. This situation is creating two 
problems, an internal problem to the taxi drivers (higher empty kilometers means lower benefits) and an external 
problem to the citizens (congestion and pollution). The first problem is being aggravated with the actual economic 
crisis, which is breaking the market equilibrium: demand is decreasing due to the lower incomes of the population 
and offer is increasing due to the increasing number of taxi drivers (not taxi licenses). Market equilibrium cannot be 
achieved in this concrete market because of the regulations (price is not established freely), and cannot go to the 
next equilibrium point due to the price policies imposed in each city. This is a vicious cycle, where empty hours are 
increasing, and taxi drivers need to work more time in order to have the same income, which means lower income 
per hour (Daniel (2006)). In this situation, taxi drivers prefer to stop at taxi stands and wait for a client, without 
expending fuel in empty trips and consequently saturating the taxi stands. If taxi stops network is not well designed, 
this situation will create a decrease in the Level of Service of the passengers, decreasing the demand and congesting 
the streets near the taxi stops. 
The taxi sector has been traditionally a regulated market in terms of fares and entry control. The objective of this 
regulation is to correct the defects of the taxi sector, such as externalities (congestion and contamination), low level 
of service offered and anticompetitive behavior of the market. A fundamental distinction in types of taxi regulations 
is between quantity regulation, quality regulation and market conduct regulation. Quality regulation embraces the 
standard of vehicles, driver and operator; this type of regulation is more a safety regulation than a competitiveness 
one. Market conduct regulation includes rules regarding pick up of passengers, or affiliation to a radio network. 
Quantity regulations include price regulation and entry restriction. From now and on, the term regulation will refer 
to quantity regulation. Restrictions on entry to the taxi market have been applied by many cities around the world, 
but actually many cities are deregulating their markets. The most common justifications used for controlling the 
entrance to the taxi market are the protection of the taxi drivers incomes and the externalities (pollution and 
congestion) caused by the circulating taxis, but when decisions are taken without a good justification or 
implementation plan, entry restrictions and fare regulations are distorting economically the taxi sector, leading to 
important welfare losses. As a result of entry control, the price of the licenses in markets where taxi licenses are 
tradeable are higher (Paris 125.000 €, Sydney 300.000 $, Melbourne 500.000$, New York 600.000$  [OECD 2007]), 
and they are rising up constantly due to the exploitation of their owners. Reforms have often been opposed to reduce 
the incomes of drivers, which are normally low, and restrictive conditions have been applied in this direction, but 
there is no evidence that taxi incomes are higher in markets with regulated entry conditions. Oppositely, license 
owners is the group who is being beneficiated by these measures, and not the drivers (Melbourne, as commented 
above has taxi licenses valuated in 500.000$, but driver incomes are estimated at 8 – 14$ per hour [OECD 2007]). 
Deregulation has most of the times positive impacts, resulting in lower waiting times, increased consumer 
satisfaction and price falling (OECD 2007). Market liberalization is an interesting challenge for many cities, but in 
cities where strong supply restrictions have been applied, there will be a strong opposition to reform proposals from 
the license-owners. Arguments support that license-owners must be compensated in that case: one approach (first 
used in Ireland) is to give the additional licenses to each license-owner, ensuring that the new monopoly will remain 
in their hands; alternatively the new license can be given to taxi drivers without taxi license (OECD 2007). In 
Melbourne, a 12 year program is adding to the stock of licenses a number of licenses equal to the yearly demand 
growth. Other concepts are important in relation to deregulation, most of the times quantity deregulation means 
quality regulation, ensuring safety and minimum service standards.  
The paper is structured as follows: the second chapter presents the taxi market, describing the operational modes. 
The third chapter resumes the different models presented in the literature, from the aggregated models until the 
equilibrium models. The next chapter highlights the most important ideas and results from the literature review, 
analyzing the operational modes, the market equilibrium and the regulation of the taxicab markets. The fifth chapter 
presents an overview of the taxi markets in different cities around the world, resuming the deregulation 
consequences observed in the deregulated markets. Finally, the last chapter contains the conclusions obtained from 
the literature and state of the practice review and proposes the development of a new model for the study of the 
taxicab market. 
152  Josep Maria Salanova et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 20 (2011) 150–161
2. The taxi market 
Taxis are private vehicles used for public transport services providing door to door personal transport. Taxi 
services can be divided into three broad categories: rank market, hail market and prebooked market.  
x Rank places are designated places where taxi can wait for passengers and vice versa. Taxis and customers are 
forming queues regulated by a FIFO system. Disadvantages are that due to the FIFO policy established price has 
no effects on customer choice, and that customers must walk until the nearest taxi stop. 
x In the hail market clients hail a cruising taxi on the street. There is uncertainty about the waiting time and the 
quality/fare of the service customers will find. Advantage here is that customer mustn’t walk until the taxi stop. 
In this case a monopolistic market is possible. 
x In the pre-booked market consumers telephone a dispatching center asking for an immediate taxi service or for a 
later taxi service. Only in this kind of market consumers can choose between different service providers or 
companies. At the same time, companies can fidelize clients with a good door to door service. The market here is 
a competitive market where larger companies can offer smaller waiting times. 
3. Taxi models review 
From the early 70’s many studies have been published in relation to the taxi sector. While first studies (1970-
1990) were related to the profitability of the sector and the necessity for regulation using aggregated models, later 
studies (1990-2010) implemented more realistic models in the taxi sector: from the most simple model of Wong 
developed in 1997 for a little taxi fleet until the most sophisticated model of Wong (2009) being able to simulate 
congestion, elasticity of demand, different user classes, external congestion and non linear costs, taking into account 
different market configurations. Douglas (1972) developed the first taxi model in an aggregated way, using 
economic relationships from other sectors (goods and services). Many authors (de Vany (1975), Beesley (1973), 
Beesley and Glaster (1983) and Schroeter (1983)) used the model proposed by Douglas for developing their models 
and tested them in the different market configurations. Manski and Wright (1976), Arnott (1996) and Cairns and 
Liston-Heyes (1996) developed structural models, obtaining more realistic results. Yang and Wong (1997-2010c) 
developed accurate models, taking into account the spatial distribution of demand and supply in the city using traffic 
assignment models. Last models proposed by Wong et al. (2005) and Yang et al. (2010b) assume a bidirectional 
function taking account the willingness to pay of customers, making it much more realistic. New technologies 
applied to the taxi market such as GPS, GIS and GPRS were also simulated in the different models, proving their 
benefits and justifying their use. Many of the models developed have been tested in different cities around the world 
using data from different sources. Beesley (1973) and Beesley and Gaister (1983) studied the data obtained from 
questionnaires in different cities in the UK, especially from London. Schroeter (1983) is the first to use data from 
taximeters in his model, using the data from a taxi company in Minneapolis (EEUU). Schaller (2007) uses 
interviews and questionnaires from taxi agents and customers in different cities of the EEUU. 
3.1. Aggregated models 
Douglas (1972) was the precursor of the first studies related to the taxi sector. He considered a taxicab market 
where taxicabs can be engaged anywhere along the city streets, with scheduled (by a regulatory authority) fares, and 
free entry. He concluded that the maximum revenue to the industry occurs at the point where demand is less than 
maximum, characterizing social welfare as an efficient but unfeasible (deficit) equilibrium. He also proved that 
taking into account the social welfare, the points where the number of taxi hours in service is maximized and where 
demand is max are the same. The formulation proposed by Douglas (1975) has been used as reference formulation 
by all the later authors. De Vany (1975) proposed solutions for different type of markets: the Monopoly market 
(with entry and fares regulated), the Competitive market (with free entry and regulated fares) and the Medallion 
market. In the monopoly solution, the firm’s program proposed by De Vany (1975) is to maximize total benefits, 
while in the competitive solution the owners’ objective is to maximize their own benefits. He proved that demand is 
maximized subject to a zero-profit constraint. He agrees with Douglas (1972) in that the efficient price minimizes 
output and observes that a comparable increase in the regulated price will be more likely to expand capacity under 
competition than under monopoly. Beesley (1973) and Beesley and Glaister (1983) also investigated the different 
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markets and their characteristics, trying to establish guidelines for decision makers using a model for simulating 
relevant inferences in the taxicab market. He identifies and analyzes the important elements and the defects of 
regulation (monopoly rights, entry conditions and fare control), introducing the external cost (congestion produced 
by taxi cabs) and testing his ideas in the taxicab data obtained from London, Liverpool, Manchester and 
Birmingham. He concludes that bigger elasticity than 1 is only possible in a regulated market, and in consequence 
free markets have lower elasticity than 1 (as postuled by De Vany (1975)). Manski and Wright (1976) concluded 
that over a certain range, increasing the number of licenses will decrease expected waiting time and increase 
expected utilization rate. Schroeter (1983) developed a theoretical model in a regulated market where radio dispatch 
and airport cabstand are the primary modes of operation and applied his methodology to the Minneapolis taxi sector. 
Daganzo (1978) was the first that studied the travel and waiting time as physical variables. He studied the optimal 
size of the taxi fleet using the queue theory proposed by De Little. This minimum fleet ensures a minimum level of 
service at the end of the desired region (bigger waiting times are unacceptable). Foerster and Gilbert (1979) studied 
the effects of regulation within a framework of eight regulatory scenarios involving different prices, entry policies 
and type of industry concentration factors. They pointed out the following: in an unorganized industry, price will not 
be regulated by the market, it will tend to rise without any countervailing down pressure, decreasing the utilization 
rate; if prices are fixed, monopoly will produce a lower level of output in relation to the level produced by the 
competitive industry (as concluded by De Vany (1975)); entry control has the same effects, increasing price in both 
types of industry. They propose different guidelines for Public Policy in relation to their work and suggest that 
empirical data is necessary to document and prove regulatory impacts. Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) analyzed the 
monopoly market, the social optimum (maximizing the sum of the social and industrial benefits) and the second best 
(non-negative profits). They observed that profits are zero when taxis are used at their optimal intensity. They 
showed that price regulation is necessary for producing equilibrium in a simple model of taxi services, but second 
best can be only achieved if fares and intensity of use of taxi-cabs are controlled, concluding that regulation is 
needed for achieving second best. Arnott (1996) analyzed the shadow cost of taxis in the first best, proposing 
subsidization for covering these costs in the vacant trips. He developed a structural model considering a uniform 
customer demand distribution over a spatially homogenous two-dimensional city, and a dispatching center supply. 
He concluded that subsidization is necessary, justifying it with the decentralization of the social optimum, observing 
that the shadow cost is covered only when taxis are busy. Chang and Huang (2003) expanded the research of 
Douglas (1972) optimizing the vacancy rate and fares. Chang and Chu (2009) continued the work of Chang and 
Huang (2003) using a more generalized model with the welfare maximization objective for avoiding the elasticity 
constraint. Their model can analyze and optimize the vacancy rate and fares subsiding in a first-best environment. 
Daniel (2003) models a taxi-cab market in which fare and entry are regulated, testing it using the data obtained by 
Schaller (2007). He finds an inelastic relationship between vacant taxicabs and demand. He uses a demand function 
depending on the price of the service and the number of vacant taxi cabs. Fernandez et al. (2006) studied the 
characteristics of the cruising taxi market, proving that a unique equilibrium exists for a deregulated market and it 
corresponds to a monopolistic equilibrium. They conclude that entry regulations are redundant with fare regulations, 
producing worse industry conditions. They observed that, for an atomized supply of services where many small 
operators exist, the returns to scale make impossible to obtain the social optimum without subsidy, as postulated by 
Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) and Arnott (1996). They conclude that the need for regulation should be carefully 
considered case by case, due to the fact that the difference between second best and unregulated free market 
equilibrium depends on the specified case studied. Massow and Canbolat (2010) develop a model for simulating the 
taxicab behaviour in a dispatching market where taxis are assigned to virtual queues generated in each zone, and 
also in high demand points. They conclude that taxis will wait in the borders between zones and propose the creation 
of super zones for increasing the level of service to customers.  
3.2. Equilibrium models 
The above studies examined extensively both price and entry controls in the taxicab market, basing their models 
in aggregate demand and supply and testing them in different markets (monopolistic and competitive). The principal 
assumptions are the relation between the waiting time and the total number of vacant taxi hours, constant operating 
cost per hour and demand estimation based in fares and waiting time of passengers. Some of the authors presented 
above used structural models, going further in the taxi market simulation. These structural models include the work 
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of Manski and Wright (1976), who provided a specified structural model of a single taxi stand, and Arnott (1996), 
who investigated the first best solution considering a spatial uniform customer demand distribution. Yang and Wong 
presented a series of models during the years 1997 – 2010 studying the taxicab market in the network of Hong 
Kong. Their spatial models are more realistic than the aggregated. Yang and Wong (1998) presented a network 
model describing how vacant and occupied taxis will cruise in an urban network searching customers and providing 
transportation services to them. They assume stationary taxi movements and customer demand, no demand 
elasticity, no congestion, “all-or-nothing” routing behaviour and that each taxi tries to minimize its travel time when 
searching for a new client. They supposed that the expected searching time in each zone is identically distributed 
following a Gumbel density function and that the probability of a vacant taxi in a zone to meet a customer in another 
zone follows a logit model, using a parameter of information for taking into account the taxi driver experience (older 
drivers will find a ride faster), proving that with better knowledge of the supply smaller fleets can have better results 
for both, taxi drivers and customers. They conclude that taxi fleet and information of taxicabs must be regulated in 
order to achieve better taxi utilization while maintaining a certain level of service. Wong and Yang (1998) improved 
the algorithm for guarantying convergence in large-scale applications. Yang et al. (2000) analyzed the demand (taxi 
availability)-supply (taxi utilization) relationship in the taxi market, developing a nonlinear simultaneous equations 
system of passenger demand, taxi utilization and level of service. The proposed model is based on the concept of 
queuing theory and demand-supply equilibrium, using the number of licenses, fare, income and occupied taxi time 
as exogenous variables, while demand, waiting time, taxi availability, utilization and waiting time of drivers are the 
endogenous variables. They estimated the parameters of their model using survey data, presenting the value of the 
endogenous variables listed above in relation to the number of taxis and the fares applied. Wong et al. (2001) added 
congestion to the network and elasticity to the demand. Evaluating their results they agree with Manski and Wright 
(1976), Schroeter (1983) and Arnott (1996) in the fact that an increase in the number of taxis will be beneficial for 
both, customer and drivers, but only in a small taxi fleet since this is an unstable situation, and seldom emerges in a 
realistic taxi market. Wong and Wong (2002) developed a more efficient solution algorithm and analyzed the social 
surplus of the taxi market. Wong et al. (2004) simulated the real mode choice with different types of users and mode 
classes. Yang et al. (2005) investigated the consequences of externalities in the different markets. They postulated 
that a profitable first-best social optimal emerges in a severely congested taxi market, where the entry of additional 
taxis into the market has a large marginal congestion effect (and thus the entry should be highly controlled at the 
social optimum). They conclude that in the competitive market the second-best solution leads to a more efficient use 
of taxis, with a higher demand served with a smaller fleet and higher fare. All the models commented above use a 
linear taxi fare structure, making long-distance (from/to the airport) trips more profitable and creating over-supply in 
airports, wasting many taxi service hours in the airport queue. Schaller (2007) proved that a free entrance to the 
market in the USA and Canada had as consequence the reduction of the level of service, because taxi drivers will 
only realize the most profitable trips. In order to diverge excess taxi supply from the airport to other areas, 
increasing the utilization of the taxi capacity and increasing the quality of the service, Yang et al. (2010a) included a 
nonlinear taxi pricing of taxi services in their model. They identified the win-win situation (surplus for both 
producer and consumer) created by a Pareto-improving situation, allocating more efficiently the taxi services in the 
whole territory. Hyunmyung et al. (2005) added the stochastic behaviour of the demand developing a stochastic 
modelling approach in a dynamic transportation network. They simulated taxi drivers’ learning process 
implementing the day-to-day evolution approach introduced by Horowitz (1984), Vythoulaks (1990) and Cascetta 
and Cantarella (1991). They tested their model in a test network, generating demand at each node based on the 
demand rate at each peak period and the trip distribution pattern, proving drivers capacity in predicting passenger 
queues at nodes. They also investigate the effectiveness of taxi information systems in reducing unnecessary travels, 
proving that using information systems is equivalent to an increase in the number of taxis by 20% in regard to the 
quality of the service (as pointed out by Yang and Wong). 
4. Critical review 
The extended literature overview presented above is resumed below, highlighting the important factors presented 
and discussed in the above models, unifying conclusions and identifying debilities and gaps. All authors developed 
models for analyzing the effects of regulations in the taxi market. They proposed mathematical formulas for 
calculating demand and supply, simulating different types of markets and obtaining different results for each 
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regulation scheme. Aggregated models calculated total demand and supply using different parameters: Douglas 
(1972) used the price of the trip and the expected waiting time for calculating the demand, and a flat cost rate for the 
supply, he stated that if different users have different willingness to pay, the regulator must find a price p for all, 
maximizing global benefits; De Vany (1975) added an index of the full prices to the calculation of the demand; 
Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) supposed uniform demand within the day decreasing with the increase of the 
waiting time; Chang and Huang (2003) and Chang and Chu (2009) used log-nonlinear and log-linear functions 
respectively for simulating demand; Daniel (1978) used a demand function depending on the number of vacant taxis 
and the price; Fernandez et al. (2006) used the generalized price for obtaining the demand; Manski and Wright 
(1976) assumed a Poisson process of customer arrivals in a FIFO queue discipline for the rank market. Massow and 
Canbolat (2010) develop a double queue model simulating a dispatching market, where drivers are assigned to 
queues in zones and high demand points. Equilibrium models calculated spatial demand and supply: Arnott (1996) 
considered a uniform demand distribution over a spatially homogenous two-dimensional city; Yang and Wong 
(1998) used the model of Douglas (1972) in an origin-destination matrix, where demand is fixed for each pair OD; 
Wong et al. (2001) considered separate demand exponential functions for each pair O-D, depending on waiting time, 
travel time and trip price, adding elasticity to the demand function; Wong et al. (2004) included multiple user classes 
and taxi models; Yang et al. (2010a) used a non-linear taxi pricing for treating long-distance trips; Hyunmyung et al. 
(2005) used a stochastic demand. Figure 1 below shows the evolution of the taxicab models in relation to the added 
value of each model. 
 
 
Figure 1 Evolution of the taxicab models 
Different fundamental matters of the taxicab market have been investigated by the authors, such as elasticity of 
demand, external cost, returns to scale and the relation between supply and demand. Elasticity of demand has been 
an important issue: De Vany (1975) proved that unit elasticity represents zero profit, and higher elasticity than one a 
negative profit, concluding that elasticity must be less than one. Daniel (2003) obtained an inelastic relationship 
between vacant taxis and demand. Yang et al. (2005) concluded that the unitary elasticity achieves the maximum 
competitive taxi fleet size. Congestion was not present in the first models, but later models take it into account, 
becoming an important factor in the discussions about first best and second best solutions: Beesley (1973) 
introduced the external cost produced by the congestion generated by the taxis in the network; Fernandez et al. 
(2006) showed that externalities will reduce waiting time and operational cost. Wong et al. (2001) affirm that 
demand decreases with congestion, but at the same time trip income increases; Yang et al. (2005) prove that first 
best can be obtained with congestion. Returns to scale are a matter of discussion in many models: Manski and 
Wright (1976) assumed increasing returns to scale concluding that increasing the number of licenses, waiting time 
156  Josep Maria Salanova et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 20 (2011) 150–161
will decrease while utilization rate will increase; Schroeter (1983) was opposed to the scale economies announced 
by Manski and Wright (1976), affirming that an increase in the number of taxis will reduce waiting time, increasing 
demand, but reducing earning for each taxi, in opposition to Daganzo (1978), who stated that taxis do not have 
significant economies of scale; Fernandez et al. (2006) showed that economies of scale are produced by 
externalities, and affirms that these returns to scale make impossible the social optimum without subsidy (as 
observed by Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) and Arnott (1996)). All authors agree with the different market 
equilibriums commented above (first best/second best). Many models studied two equilibrium points for the 
competitive market, the first best and the second best. Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) identified the first best as the 
social optimum (maximizing the sum of the social and industrial benefits), finding its zero profit character (only 
covers busy trips) and concluding that regulation is needed for obtaining the second best (non-negative profits); 
Arnott (1996) proposed subsidization for achieving the first best (basically the subsidy will cover empty trips), 
oppositely, Yang et al. (2002) showed that in the point at which total surplus is maximized, industry profits are 
negative (first best). They propose the second best solution instead of subsidization; Chang and Chu (2009) 
optimized vacancy rate and fare subsidization for obtaining first best, obtaining analytical formulas for the vacant 
and occupied distance, vacancy rate and fare; Fernandez et al. (2006) agree with the idea that first best does not 
cover costs, while second best covers operation costs and maximizes social welfare; Yang et al. (2005) postulated 
that congestion can make profitable the first best, and that second best solution leads to a more efficient use of taxis 
(higher demand served with smaller fleet and fares). Many authors presented the equilibrium points (first and second 
best) graphically, representing demand and fare in the axes, and using different mathematical functions for obtaining 
optimum fleet and fares. Aggregated and equilibrium models have focused exclusively on the taxi availability for 
calculating the customer waiting time, and therefore the demand resulted. Schroeter (1983) presented a matching 
function between the taxi availability and the taxi demand; Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) used a model of search 
for drivers and customers; Wong et al. (2005) used stochastic searching behavior with a bilateral searching and 
meeting function between taxi drivers and customers; Matsushima and Kobayashi (2006) implemented a double-
queue system simulating waiting and meeting between taxis and customers in a simple taxi stand; Yang et al. 
(2010b) modeled a network bilateral searching and meeting between taxis and customers. Yang et al. (2010c) 
investigated the properties of an aggregate taxi service model using bilateral searching and meeting functions 
(considering a specific form of the Cobb-Douglas type production function) for characterizing the meeting frictions 
between vacant taxis and customers. They examined the market profitability at social optimum, finding that taxi 
services should be subsidized only when there are returns to scale in the meeting function (same conclusion obtained 
by Fernandez et al. (2006)). 
4.1. Market conditions 
Most of the models were tested in different market conditions, such as competitive industry or monopoly. De 
Vany (1975) stated that in the monopoly market, industry tries to obtain the maximum benefit, while in the 
competitive industry each driver tries to maximize its benefits. General conclusions are that the monopoly industry 
will obtain the maximum total benefit with a small fleet and high prices, covering only the high-income demand 
sector, with a poor level of service. Douglas (1972) observed that in the point of maximum benefit for the industry, 
the total number of taxi hours is maximum, but the demand is not. Foerster and Gilbert (1979) affirmed that if price 
is fixed, the monopoly market will produce lower level of output. Fernandez et al. (2006) proved that the unique 
feasible equilibrium in a deregulated market is the monopoly solution. Yang et al. (2005) postulated that the 
monopolist would charge a price in excess of marginal cost per ride by an amount equal to the consumer´s marginal 
net willingness-to-pay for a ride. Different market configurations were proposed: De Vany (1975) studied a market 
with limited entry, but unrestrained price concluding that maximum demand is subjected to zero profit; Foerster and 
Gilbert (1979) proposed and studied eight different market configurations (monopoly-competitive/regulated-
unregulated price/regulated-unregulated entry) concluding that price will rise without control in an unorganized 
industry while utilization rate decreases; entry control will have the same effects on both types of industry. Each 
market configuration has different optimal prices and capacities: De Vany (1975) affirms that price and capacity in 
the monopoly market are lower than price and capacity in the competitive market. From their findings:  
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x In the monopolistic market, without fare regulation higher fares will satisfy lower demand with a smaller fleet, 
maximizing the benefit of the operator (Douglas (1972)). With regulated fares, the same market will operate with 
the fleet in that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost (De Vany (1975)). 
x In the competitive market, the operator will try to achieve the first best (social optimum), maximizing the benefits 
of the society (taking into account externalities commented above). Douglas (1972) and Arnott (1996) proved 
that in the first best, the driver income will only cover the occupied time, creating the necessity of subsidizing the 
empty time and therefore achieving the second best. 
x Fleet size is one of the most important factors for decision-makers. In a small market, fluctuations in fares will 
not affect demand because the waiting time has higher importance, but in a big market, fares are important for the 
demand generation as pointed out by Wong et al. (2001). 
4.2. Operational modes 
The three operational modes (rank, hail and dispatching center) have been modeled by many authors, some of 
them differencing the airport market from the rank market due to the special circumstances of the airport taxi stands. 
Arnott (1996) states that dispatching centers are used in small cities, while in big cities cruising markets are more 
frequent. The normal situation in many big cities is a mix of the three operation models, but no model has 
investigated them at the same time. Schaller (2007) proposes a very interesting representation of the situation of 
each city in relation to the operational modes, using a triangle with Dispacth, Hank and Rail operational mode in 
each vertex. He represents each city as a point inside the triangle in relation to the situation of the taxi market (only 
dispatching centers, only rank points, only hail or a mix of them). Farrell (2010) explored patterns of taxi 
engagement and relationships between generated trips and taxi rank locations for optimizing the taxi rank 
distribution in relation to the demand patterns in a 3 level (county, town, stand) model. She applies her findings to 
the Ireland taxicab market, and realized a comparative cost benefit analysis, identifying benefits and disbenefits 
resulting from developing new taxi stands. He obtained a cost-benefit ratio of 1-11 for the construction of a new 
rank, and 1-3 for the relocation of an existing rank. Massow and Canbolat (2010) propose the creation of super 
zones for reducing the waiting time of clients in a dispatching center environment. 
4.3. Regulation 
Historically most of the taxi markets were regulated (basically controlling entry and fares). Fares are easy to 
regulate, fixing a maximum price and regulating the way fares are applied to customers (per time, per distance, 
supplies, etc). Most of the entry regulations were done simply freezing the number of taxi licenses, without 
supporting in any way why the actual/current number of taxis was optimal, or simply good. Most of the cities 
maintained the number of taxis at 1980 levels, only some cities increased timidly their number of licenses following 
the GDP value or other economic indexes. Indeed, Daniel (2006) highlighted that in many regulated markets there is 
overcapacity.  This mistake created in many cities a suboptimal taxi market, or an inefficient taxi market, with more 
taxicabs than needed or less vehicles than needed. Many authors support that the situation of the market has 
enormous influence in the results of the regulation, and this situation must be studied in the moment of the 
regulation for justifying each measure adopted, from the number of taxis until the value of fares, concluding that the 
starting point of the market is crucial in the success of the regulation policies. Loo et al. (2007) conclude that due to 
the economic nature of the market, the price of the taxi licenses depends more on economical factors than on the 
demand for taxi services. Fernandez et al. (2006) affirm that both regulations must not act simultaneously, entry 
regulations are redundant with fare regulation, and the effect of entry regulation is negative in a market where fares 
are regulated (and vice versa). A small number of authors tried to develop models for obtaining the optimum 
number of taxis, Schaller (2007) conducted a regression analysis on seven variables concluding that the taxi demand 
is generated by households without private cars or trips to the airport. There are two different arguments in favor of 
entry control in taxicab markets, economic and non-economic. The economic argument is the social welfare 
achievable with entry control, avoiding market failures. Non-economic arguments are potential cross-modal 
competition, congestion and pollution issues. Moore and Balaker (2006) stated recently that most of the economic 
opinions favor open entry to the taxi industry. OECD (2007) identifies arguments against free entry and arguments 
against controlled entry, (resumed in Table 1). 
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Table 1 Arguments against free entry and entry control. Source: Own elaboration from OECD (2007) and CENIT (2004). 
Arguments Against free entry Against entry control 
Productivity arguments Excess of capacity  
“Diversion” of demand from PT 
Augment of demand  
Most efficient use of resources 
Impact on congestion/pollution More taxis than the optimum (more congestion) Less Private Vehicles (less congestion) 
Distributional arguments an 
competitiveness 
Preserve the income position from incumbent 
laborers 
Reduction of development of new products (rivalry) 
Impacts on service quality and 
information 
Reduced standards of taxi services Absence of information, tools and rules for regulators 
5. State of practice 
Each country/city has its own regulation for the taxi market. Table 2 shows the regulation characteristics of some 
countries/cities along the world. As shown in Table 2, a few countries have deregulated the taxicab market; from 
their experience some deregulation effects can be exposed: 
x Sweden (1990): greater taxi fleet, greater accessibility for customers, reduction of waiting time, different type of 
available vehicles. 
x Ireland (2000): quadriplication of the number of license and fare and quality regulation needed for avoiding 
overcharging and uncompetitive operation of the market (uncertainity of waiting for another taxi and price 
competition unlikely to work at ranks). 
x Japan (2002): 8.4% and 9.7% increase in the number of companies and taxis respectively. Introduction of a large 
variety of fares, discounts and flat rates. 
x United States (Seattle 1979): 5% reduction in fares (taxi-stand rose while radio-dispatch fell); increase in service 
at the airport, generating queues, but without price reduction due to the FIFO queuing system applied. 
x United States (Indianapolis 1994): Increase in the number of cabs and companies, fare reductions, service 
improvements and reduction in customer complaints.  
x United States: fare control is needed for controlling the appropriate level of entry; use of contracts between firms 
and hotels/airport authorities for avoiding queues at those locations where waiting times are always low. 
x Taiwan: over-supply and high vacancy rate, resulting in poor service, unhealthy competition and law-breaking 
behaviours. 
x Number of taxis in Dublin increased by 216% in the two years after deregulation. In New Zealand, the number of 
taxies increased also by almost 200% following deregulation. In Sweden, the number of taxies was doubled in the 
first two years after deregulation, but simultaneously, significant innovations had occurred for encouraging taxi 
use in off-peak periods. 
Most of the authors agree with the above, a liberalization of the market will increase the taxi fleet and level of 
service to the customers, but a fare regulation is needed. As exposed by Fernandez et al. (2010), a fare regulation is 
enough for controlling the taxi market as concluded in the USA example. The example of deregulation in the United 
States confirmed the exposed by Schaller (2007); taxi drivers will create over-supply in airports due to the lower 
waiting time and higher income if there are no regulations. It is important to highlight that the effects of deregulation 
will depend on the initial pre-deregulation situation. In markets where regulation kept supply close to free entry 
equilibrium levels and low license values there will be no changes, but in markets where the number of taxis is very 
low due to the strict applied regulation, supply will increase importantly after deregulation, as occurred in the 
examples listed above. This entry of new supply will lead to low incomes, high fares and business failure (short 
terms results), while the adaptation of consumers will be in a long term horizon. 
For analyzing the relation between the number of taxis, the population and other economic values, analytical 
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Table 2 Regulation issues in different cities around the world. Source: Own elaboration from OECD (2007). 
Country - Zone/city Fare regulation Entry regulation Period Reestrictions / Characteristics 
Belgium yes yes 5-10 years 1 vehicle per 1.000 hab / personal and intransferable 
Czech Republic yes no  intransferable 
Denmark yes yes 10 years intransferable 
France - Paris yes yes  100 new licenses per year 
Germany yes no 5 years license subjected to a quota 
Hungary yes    
Ireland yes no (2000)  license subjected to a fee and quota 
Italy yes yes  4,5 per 10.000 hab / 1 lic per person 
Japan yes no (2002)   
Korea yes yes   
Netherlands yes (2004) no (2002)   
Norway depending on the city yes  not tradable, not transferable 
Sweden  no (1990)   
Switzerland depending on the city yes 3 years not tradable, not transferable 
United States - Seattle no (1979) no (1979)   
Romania yes yes  4 vehicles per 1.000 hab 
Table 3 General data related to the taxi market of different European cities. Source: CENIT (2004) 




















Amsterdam 14.8 14.1 2.2 1404 95 850,000 57.3 34100 1504.5 1.77 
Athens 7.4 23.1 1.6 256 35 3,900,000 65.7 11600 15249 3.91 
Barcelona 8.5 17.7 1.8 594 70 4,390,000 74.7 17100 11765.2 2.68 
Berlin 11.3 9.8 1.8 1199 106 3,390,000 54.7 20300 6949.5 2.05 
Brussels 14.9 19 2.5 1495 100 964,000 73.6 23900 1243.56 1.29 
Budapest 6.2 22.5 1.1 201 32 1,760,000 46.3 9840 5596.8 3.18 
Copenhagen 14.9 13 2.3 2661 179 1,810,000 23.5 34100 2805.5 1.55 
Dublin 6.2 8.5 1.2 919 148 1,120,000 25.9 35600 1993.6 1.78 
Lisbon 5.3 5.6 0.8 441 83 2,680,000 27.9 17100 4529.2 1.69 
London 12.5 11.4 1.8 1286 103 7,170,000 54.9 36400 55997.7 7.81 
Madrid 9.8 15.8 2 594 61 5,420,000 55.7 20000 14471.4 2.67 
Milan 9.9 17.6 1.6 997 101 2,420,000 71.7 30200 4573.8 1.89 
Oslo 18.8 9.7 2.5 1570 84 981,000 26.1 42900 2148.39 2.19 
Paris 8.7 12 1.3 1095 126 11,100,000 40.5 37200 17538 1.58 
Prague 6.8 15.2 1.5 314 46 1,160,000 44 15100 3978.8 3.43 
Rome 8.3 19 1.3 997 120 2,810,000 62.6 26600 5816.7 2.07 
Stockholm 11.9 7.8 3.5 1879 158 1,840,000 18.1 32700 5207.2 2.83 
Vienna 15.7 17.6 3 914 58 1,550,000 66.9 34300 4433 2.86 
Warsaw 4.2 12.8 0.8 241 57 1,690,000 51.5 13200 5999.5 3.55 
*2002 prices, 5 km trip, day fares, inside the city  ** Taxi cost per km/bus cost per km  *** Cost per km/cost of 1 liter of oil  ****National average 
 
Conclusions obtained from the table 3 are: 
x A logic result is that average trip fare is higher in cities with higher GDP. A relation with monthly earnings and 
cost of taxi in relation to cost of oil exists also. 
x The relation taxi cost versus bus cost grows with the density of the city, due to the economies of scale of the 
Mass Public Transport. 
x The number of taxis has a very strong relation with the population of the city (excluding London and Paris). This 
relation is between 1.3 and 4 taxis per thousand inhabitants (in London this relation is 8 taxis per 1000 
inhabitants). 
6. Conclusions 
As time goes by models are getting more and more realistic. First models used aggregated values, without taking 
into account that the taxicab market is working in an urban network, sharing the streets with daily traffic and other 
public transport modes. Later models introduced this spatial characteristic, and many other rules for simulating the 
real taxi market, as the network knowledge or the learning process of the taxi drivers, with a good effort in the 
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calculation of the passenger trip generation-distribution and assignment. Lastest developed models concentrate their 
effort in the customer-driver search function, increasing the reality of the simulation of the finding process between 
a taxi and a customer. Many interesting ideas have been developed in parallel with the evolution of the models, such 
as the day to day learning process or the use of the logit model for the probability of finding a client in each zone.  
Main general conclusions obtained from the models presented are: 
x Although many models tried to be a tool for decision makers, developed models cannot prove the performance 
level of the taxi markets. There are no optimum models of taxi supply to guide decision makers.  
x Models proposed in the literature are characterized by significant data requirements due to the high number of 
determinants in the taxi demand and supply. Actually, with the use of GPS and GIS, data recollection is 
technically easy, but the reticence of the taxi sector to share this data is an important barrier. 
x All the models have investigated the taxi market from the point of view of the taxi driver (income) and the 
customer (waiting time, level of service, total cost), but no model has studied the consequences of the market 
regulations on the city (contamination, congestion). It is important to add environmental considerations as a 
determinant factor in the future models since in most of the cities, taxi flows have not only negative 
consequences on the rest of the traffic, but also in the citizen’s health. 
x Regulation of entry and fares must not act together; deregulation of access to the taxi market must be achieved in 
most of the cities, increasing the supply and the level of service of customers. Entry deregulation must be 
accompanied with new regulations, such as fare regulation (almost with a maximum fare control) and special 
regulations on high-demand generation points, such as airports, train stations or hotels. 
In the opinion of the authors, both approaches are useful, each one used in its respective scale. Aggregated models 
can explain major variations in the taxi market using fewer variables, simulating fare and entry regulations easily 
and obtaining clear results. More detailed models can better simulate the taxicab market, taking into account the 
spatial characteristics of demand and supply, the different types of operational modes working together in the same 
city, the external and internal factors that are generating the demand, and the congestion (because when the streets 
are congested is when the demand for trips is higher). They can also work with spatial variables that aggregated 
models cannot take into account, adapting each model to the reality of each city. Data availability is an important 
matter for modeling the taxi market, as the more detailed the model is the more accurate the results will be, but the 
data will be more difficult to recollect; on the contrary, aggregate models need less quantity and not such as high 
quality of data, but results are not as analytical as they can be in a more detailed model. With new developed ITS 
and other technologies, a lot of data can be recorded, and more detailed and complex models can be developed. 
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